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FINDING A PLACE FOR MARGINAL
MIGRANTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS SYSTEM
Leila Kawar
This article examines how international human rights law is shaping the politics of
immigration. It argues that migrant human rights are neither conceptually nor
practically incompatible with an international order premised upon state territorial
sovereignty, and that the specific aesthetics of the contemporary international human
rights system, namely its formalistic and legalistic tendencies, has facilitated its
integration with a realm of policymaking traditionally reserved to state discretion. An
exploration of two areas in the emerging field of migrant human rights traces the multiscalar transnational legal processes through which these norms are formulated and
internalized.

INTRODUCTION
In the “golden period” of human rights (Falk 2009) that followed the end of the
Cold War, a number of citizenship and immigration scholars announced that international
human rights norms would soon transform the politics of migration. Arguing
provocatively against Arendt’s claim that “rights of man” are nil if not encoded in citizen
rights by nation-states, they posited that the spread of human rights discourses would
create a new place for “guests and aliens” within the law. The “transnationalization” of
the legal regime most intimately tied to the principles of state territorial sovereignty was
seen to herald a new world order in which human rights would replace citizenship as the
primary marker of political affiliation.
While some of these analyses centered on the discursive implications of changes
in national laws allowing migrants access to social services programs (Layton-Henry
1990; Soysal 1994), others were more juridically oriented, arguing that international legal
regimes would imminently overpower restrictionist immigration laws. Among the more
ambitious of these transnationalist claims was Saskia Sassen’s suggestion that the
distinction between the citizen and the alien was being eroded as part of a more general
reformulation of territory, authority, and rights that she linked to structural changes in the
global economic system (1996). Sassen argued that in the new transnational order based
on human rights, and enforced through international law, even unauthorized migrants
would be able to claim rights to residence and to family reunification. David Jacobson
made similar claims (1996), arguing that the contemporary phenomenon of intensive
transnational migration undermines the relevance and legitimacy of nationally-based
models of membership. According to Jacobson, international human rights codes and
institutions provide a new model that is more appropriate to current conditions. He
suggests that the judiciary is playing a crucial role in this development by encouraging
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individuals and NGOs to make claims on the basis of international human rights
instruments.
However, not all scholars have been so optimistic about the capacity of human
rights norms to transform immigration policies. One set of criticism is based on a
perceived irreconcilability at the conceptual level between human rights and immigration
control. The contemporary international human rights system, whether embodied in the
United Nations or in regional treaty-based structures, is built upon agreements between
nation-states who enjoy complete sovereignty in matters of citizenship. Because they
exist only upon the concession of nation-states, the rights of aliens bear the heavy mark
of the state’s immigration powers and are destined to remain “stratified and reversible”
(Joppke 2010). Obligating states to grant rights to immigrants is conceptually
incompatible with a fundamental premise of the international system.
A related set of criticisms is empirically based and focuses on the manner in
which national judiciaries have integrated human rights principles into immigration law.
As a matter of practice, judicial decisions do grant rights to immigrants but they do so on
the basis of national law or international treaties that states find it in their interests to
sign. Looking at this empirical record, scholars have variously argued that judicial
recognition of immigrant and refugee rights has been animated by the commitment of the
judiciary either to norms of equal protection (Guiraudon 2000) or to principles of
reasoned decision-making (Dauvergne 2008). Not only are references to human rights
absent from most of these decisions, but analysis of the existing jurisprudence also
suggests that human rights advocates are most likely to win their cases when they frame
them not as immigration cases, but rather as administrative law cases or civil rights cases
(Motomura 2008). Based on the results of these empirical studies, and with the benefit of
hindsight, it seems clear that transnational theorists over-estimated the power of
international human rights norms to transform immigration jurisprudence.
Nevertheless, I argue in this paper that it is too soon to categorically dismiss the
potential for international human rights norms to shape the set of rights accorded to
marginal migrants. As Derrida reminds us, laws as they are embodied in the Western
tradition of state-sanctioned rights are inherently capable of according rights to foreigners
and strangers (Derrida 2000, 19). Moreover, the particular epistemic qualities of human
rights law, which make this body of law both more and less compatible with the positivist
vision of law than critics of transnationalism have acknowledged, also imbue human
rights principles with the capacity to infuse a range of other existing legal regimes
governing migration. On the one hand, international human rights law has become
sufficiently formalized and technocratic so as to be typified by conditional rather than
absolute formulations of rights, thus preempting claims of conceptual incompatibility
with sovereign authority. On the other hand, when it comes to implementation, the
norms contained in international human rights instruments are enforced through a process
that is decentralized, diffuse, and fundamentally distinct from the positivist vision of law
as the command of the sovereign. This means that international human rights norms may
well make their way into migration-related policies even when states refuse to ratify
international conventions and even if national courts refuse to cite international principles
as direct authority.
I illustrate these claims by examining two sets of transnational processes that have
formulated and implemented a human rights approach to marginal migrants: 1) the
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substantial cross-fertilization between refugee law and human rights law, and 2) the as
yet less developed but potentially far-reaching cross-fertilization of migrant labor
standards and human rights law. Conceptualizing international human rights law as
being simultaneously positivistic in its formulation and non-positivistic in its
implementation allows us to see that, contrary to the claims of previous scholarship, the
body of law governing marginal migrants is neither categorically opposed to human
rights in principle nor incompatible with human rights in practice. Instead of asserting
overly broad claims about the sources and scope of migrant rights, what is needed is a
close and careful analysis of the transnational chain of actors and activities through which
new forms of migrant human rights are being produced. Using two case studies, this
paper traces these processes by which marginal migrants are being constructed through
law as rights-bearing individuals.
THE LEGALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The contemporary system of international human rights came into being only after the
Second World War, based upon the UN Charter, the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes
trials, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Within this system, the principal
enforcers of human rights law are nation-states. The approach to human rights that the
international “community” initially adopted was primarily aspirational. “The rules were
largely declaratory and precatory, and the few mechanisms created had virtually no
enforcement” (Koh 1999, 1408)
It was not until the mid-1960s that international institutions began to undertake a
“gradual assumption of responsibility” for developing and implementing human rights
law (Alston 1992). Spurred by the influx of newly independent states, the UN finally
adopted the two conventions that together form the International Bill of Rights as well as
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Initial steps
were also taken towards strengthening the international institutions that would enforce
this new body of law. In the 1970s, the UN Commission on Human Rights, which had
been largely inactive for its first twenty years of existence, was given the power to
examine complaints filed against states by individuals and groups and was also
empowered to initiate inquiries into “thematic”—as opposed to country-specific—
violations (Steiner & Alston 2008).
The political climate of the late 1970s proved propitious for the expansion and
legalization of human rights. Political rights in particular received increased attention
from activists looking for a “neutral” alternative to the perceived excesses of both
authoritarian and totalitarian states, coinciding with shifts in US foreign policy rhetoric
during the post-Vietnam Carter Administration that created openings for the
institutionalization of human rights structures within the UN. The higher profile given to
human rights issues by the Carter Administration and several of its allies “contributed to
a climate in which task expansion was almost an imperative” (Alston 1992, 361). The
result was that a bureaucratic momentum in support of international human rights was set
in place, allowing the legalization of human rights to further develop (Falk 2009).
Despite the return to Cold War diplomacy during the 1980s, this process of
legalization continued. The United Nations General Assembly enacted a series of human
rights conventions aimed at eliminating discrimination against women, prohibiting
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torture, and protecting the rights of children. As these treaties acquired sufficient state
ratifications to enter into force, committees to monitor their implementation came into
being. These monitoring committees were staffed with technical experts who tended to
represent their expertise more than the priorities of their countries of origin when
reviewing reports on treaty compliance submitted by ratifying countries (Haas 2008).
In the post-Cold War period, the declared victory of the capitalist West and the
collapse of the communist block created a normative vacuum on the world stage,
strengthening international institutions and giving renewed energy to international human
rights law. New structures, such as the Office of the High Commissioner on Human
Rights and the Ad-Hoc International Criminal Tribunals, were created. The UN
sponsored a series of major international conferences focused on human rights, most
significantly the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna. The commitment
of the Ford Foundation to funding human rights NGOs injected additional energy into
this increasingly professionalized field (Cummings 2007; Keck & Sikkink 1998). Recent
studies suggest that human rights treaty-based institutions, which initially had difficulty
being taken seriously, are gaining increased attention, with national delegations preparing
lengthy reports assessing the national implementation of international human rights law
(Merry 2007).
The aggregate effect of these developments is that the international human rights
system had come to be characterized by a degree of legalization that those present at the
birth of the United Nations might not have anticipated. An ever-widening set of moral
claims is formulated as positive human rights law (Wilson 2007). Specialized jurists
cultivate technical expertise and seek to develop a coherent and justiciable legal regime
(Goodale 2007). Committees of experts interpret human rights instruments using
specialized procedures, striving for perfection of form rather than representing the
interests of their states of origin. The actors that produce international human rights
knowledge and the transnational continuum of activities - at various levels of scale - that
connects them have come to be characterized by “a certain aesthetic of information” that
is profoundly legalistic (Riles 2000, 2).
The conditional formulations of rights contained in contemporary international
human rights conventions are typical of this legalistic aesthetic. The 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights had adopted an aspirational and idealistic framing of rights,
but the provisions in subsequent treaties have been drafted so that rights are qualified and
balanced against other interests by phrases such as “as appropriate” or “as soon as
possible” (Merry 2006). Legalization is also apparent in the epistemic culture that has
emerged among those engaged in implementing treaty norms. In contrast with previous
less professionalized models of political solidarity activism, the current model of human
rights activism is based on classifying claims in terms of legal standards and on making
them quantifiable and verifiable (Tate 2007, 118). At the international level, the human
rights system has undergone a similar professionalization and institutionalization. As
participation in human rights treaties has grown exponentially and the proliferation of
treaty bodies has continued, these norm-declaring sites have consolidated and specialized
their internal procedures so that technical expertise is brought to bear on an ever-wider
array of claims (Crawford 2000, 3).
But is international human rights law really law? If we rely on a positivist vision
of the sovereign issuing commands that the subjects are obliged to obey, then
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international law does not look particularly law-like in its implementation. Even as
international human rights law has become increasingly technical and legalistic in its
formulation, state-to-state enforcement mechanisms seldom have the power to mandate
compliance with international principles and most enforcement remains declaratory
rather than judicial in character.
Yet, the dearth of international enforcement mechanisms does not mean that
international law is not observed. As Harold Koh explains, it is primarily through a
process of “interaction, interpretation, and internalization,” in which nongovernmental
activists play a key role, that international norms are implemented (Koh 1999, 1417).
Human rights entrepreneurs mobilize popular opinion and political support so that
international norms become socially, politically and legally internalized, with the result
that they are eventually incorporated into the domestic legal system through executive
action, legislative action, judicial interpretation, or some combination of the three.
Koh gives the example of the nongovernmental International Campaign to Ban
Landmines, which successfully pushed for an international convention on this issue.
Activists then leveraged the moral authority of international norms to lobby U.S.
legislators and administrators to enact a moratorium on the sale of landmines and to
develop new technologies to aid in demining, even though the U.S. had not yet signed the
convention. This kind of transnational process is also visible in the development and legal
internalization of international human rights norms that resulted in the outlawing of the
juvenile death penalty (Smith 2007). International norms have the potential to spread and
take root once their domestic internalization acquires sufficient momentum. Koh
suggests that just as federal automobile standards over time conditioned drivers not to
drive without a seatbelt, in part through the industry’s adoption of buckle-up alarms and
in part through a process of socialization whereby wearing seatbelts came to be viewed as
an integral part of what it meant to be a law-abiding person, so too, international legal
standards come to be internalized through multi-sited processes of institutionalization and
socialization. This conception of law’s capacity for social internalization is similar to
what socio-legal scholars have analyzed in terms of the ideological dimension of legality.
Bringing this approach to her study of transnational human rights activism
against gendered violence, Sally Engle Merry suggests that the significance of the legal
standards contained in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW) lies in their capacity to coalesce and express particular
cultural understandings, so that people come to understand themselves in terms of these
legal categories (Merry 2007). Merry shows how these standards have been used by
local activists to structure domestic political discussions, even in states that have not
officially ratified the treaty, about the need to criminalize domestic violence (Merry
2006). Although national law also has this constitutive quality, the production of new
cultural categories is the primary means of norm enforcement within the international
human rights system.
An epistemology of international human rights law that characterizes it as
legalized but not centrally-commanded, renders visible the diverse processes of
knowledge construction that have allowed human rights for marginal migrants to be
formulated and implemented. Working through this conceptual lens allows us to see how
innovative legal forms emerge and make their way into practice through a multi-sited and
multi-scaled chain of actors and activities that cannot easily be compressed into the
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confines of either an institution or a professional network (Wilson 2007). It is a form of
legality that “depends deeply on its texts” (Merry 2007, 183) even if compliance with
international law depends not on sovereign states enforcing rules but rather on the
potential of these norms to bring about an internalization of new cultural and political
categories.
As the following two case studies of “migrant rights as human rights” will
demonstrate, broad political constraints also play a part in this process. The formulation
and implementation of human rights for marginal migrants is a site of political
contestation; it is neither automatic nor inevitable. In the case of the integration of
refugee law with international human rights law, this process is fairly advanced. In the
case of migrant worker rights, new legal forms are developing but much remains to be
done in terms of implementing these human rights standards.
A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH TO REFUGEE PROTECTION
The international refugee law regime elaborates a specific, albeit narrow, place
for foreign migrants within international law. States commit themselves not to send
foreign migrants back to a country where they have a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion. According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, everyone has the
right to seek and to enjoy asylum from persecution, but asylum remains a sovereign
prerogative and there is no subjective right to be granted asylum. Moreover, unlike
human rights law, refugee law does not attempt to set a corrective agenda, tell another
country how to act, or propose plans for eradicating particular practices. “Refugee law
does not seek to reform states and does not address root causes. Its role is palliative; it
represents the interests of the individual in dissociating herself from her community and
her state” (Anker 2002, 153-154).
As with the international human rights system, the origin of international refugee
protection was closely tied the Second World War. An International Refugee
Organization was created in 1944 to assist and protect those displaced by the war. The
purpose of the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees, drafted under the auspices of the
United Nations, was to transfer this responsibility to states. As it was written, the
Convention only applied to those who had become refugees prior to 1951 as a result of
events linked to WWII. Fifteen years later, the 1967 UN Protocol on Asylum, signed in
New York but known as the “Bellagio Protocol,” expanded the refugee regime so that it
became a weapon of the Cold War to be wielded against Communist states, much as
human rights were also being instrumentalized by the Super Powers at this time.
Beginning in the late 1970s, advocates in Western countries became active in
pushing to sever the connection between refugee law and foreign policy and to develop a
more legalistic approach for refugee status determination. In the US, this activism
resulted in the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, which explicitly aimed to bring US
law more fully in line with the five grounds for persecution found in the 1967 Protocol.
Similar activism took place in European countries, coinciding with the sharp increase in
the number of asylum applicants, attributable in part to the closure of other routes to legal
immigration in the mid-1970s (Martin 1990). Nevertheless, during much of the Reagan
Presidency, refugee law as it was implemented retained an overtly Cold War approach.
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Asylum seekers from Communist states seeking asylum in the US, rather than having
their claims examined individually, were presumed to have a well-founded fear of
persecution. As human rights law became increasingly legalized, the contrast with the
Cold War approach to refugee status determination appeared increasingly pronounced.
Yet, over the past several decades, human rights and refugee protection have
become significantly more interconnected. Starting in the mid-1980s, we see the infusion
of international refugee law with human rights norms, a process that continues to shape
the substance of refugee protection. The cross-fertilization of refugee law and human
rights law has brought about important changes in how violence and persecution are
understood, both within the law and within the sphere of cultural understandings that
guide policymaking and public discussion.
One component of this process has been the transformation of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) into an active generator of legal norms.
During its first three decades, the organization’s knowledge and dissemination functions
remained underdeveloped. But as the Cold War drew to a close, the Executive
Committee of UNHCR grew increasingly active in issuing interpretations of international
refugee law as part of an ongoing dialog with a growing circle of experts and advocates
(Lambert 2009). Feminist approaches to refugee law were particularly influential in this
process of legal development (Bonnerjea 1989). The transnational women’s network that
developed in the mid-1980s around the theme of “violence against women” (See Keck &
Sikkink 1998) converged at the UNHCR, among many other sites. In 1985, the same
year as the Nairobi UN Conference on Women, advocates were successful in pushing the
UNHCR Executive Committee to mention in its conclusions the need to extend the
protection of the Convention to women facing violence for having violated the traditions
of their societies (Kelly 1993, 625).
In 1991, UNHCR went a step further; issuing guidelines that drew directly on the
CEDAW Committee’s published 1990 report interpreting gender-based violence as a
human rights violation (633). The UNHCR Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee
Women were careful to emphasize that it is national law, not international law, that
determines what legal assistance an individual receives, where she will live, and what
assistance will be provided. But they direct UNHCR staff to work with public officials in
countries of asylum in order to:
Promote acceptance in the asylum adjudication process of the principle that women fearing
persecution or severe discrimination on the basis of their gender should be considered a member
of a social group for the purposes of determining refugee status…. [And] promote acceptance of
the notion that sexual violence against women is a form of persecution when it is used by or with
the consent or acquiescence of those acting in an official capacity to intimidate or punish (High
Commissioner for Refugees 1991, 19).

Similarly-worded principles establishing the normative validity of gender-based grounds
for asylum were subsequently included in the concluding documents issued at a series of
UN conferences that took place in the early 1990s, as well as in the 1994 report of the
UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women (Anker 2002, 142).
Having established gender-based violence as both a human rights violation and a
form of persecution within international refugee law, activists then turned towards the
task of bringing these principles home to the administration of national asylum systems.
In Canada, a test case organized by a coalition of Canadian refugee advocates and
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international women’s human rights NGOs served as a focus for intensive administrative
lobbying efforts to recognize gender-based violence as persecution (Kobayashi 1995).
The Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board was responsive to these arguments, and in
1993 it issued guidelines for refugee status determination that drew on the text of the
1991 UNHCR guidelines. The Canadian Guidelines on Women Refugee Claimants
Fearing Gender-Related Persecution translate the general principles developed by
UNHCR two years earlier into a “framework of analysis” for asylum adjudicators. Using
a visual flowchart to guide adjudicators, the text outlines specific criteria for assessing the
particular circumstances which have given rise to the claimant’s fear of persecution and
lists considerations that might support a gender-based asylum claim, such as whether the
social position of women in the country of origin is such that it “engenders the degree of
discrimination likely to amount to persecution” (Immigration and Refugee Board 1993,
8).
The Vienna Conference on Human Rights in the summer of 1993 provided a site
for advocates and policymakers involved in the development of women’s refugee norms
to exchange ideas and share strategies (McClymont & Golub 2000, 52). In the following
years, advocates in Belgium and France joined in efforts to achieve recognition of asylum
claims brought by women fleeing traditional practices. At the same time, US advocates
successfully lobbied the director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service to issue a
memorandum to asylum officers, endorsing the possibility of using gender-based grounds
to grant asylum (Anker 2002, 136). The “Coven Memo” draws explicitly on the text of
the Canadian Guidelines and goes on to further elaborate some of the ways in which
women might be seen to breach social mores (marrying outside an arranged marriage,
wearing lipstick, etc) resulting in persecution.
While the Canadian and US guidelines had moved towards internalizing a human
rights approach to international refugee norms, legalization was taken a step further as
courts recognized gender-based asylum claims, and as jurisprudence in this area became
increasingly principled. In the 1996 Kasinga decision, concerning the tribal practice of
female genital cutting, the US Board of Immigration Appeals made an effort to enunciate
justiciable principles that would delimit the scope of gender-based grounds for asylum
while at the same time recognizing the legitimacy of a human rights approach to refugee
law. The concurring opinion by Board Member Lory D. Rosenberg was particularly
innovative, stating that, “The reason the persecution would be inflicted…is because of the
persecutor’s intent to overcome [Kasinga’s] state of being non-mutilated and accordingly,
free from male-dominated tribal control, including an arranged marriage” (In re Kasinga,
21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (US BIA 1996)). The opinion thus took an important step
towards translating gendered violence into refugee law’s conceptual categories.
In the Shah and Islam decision three years later, concerning wives refusing to
adhere to traditional norms, the British Law Lords went on to consider how broader
patterns of discriminatory treatment structurally enabled the specific violence the
applicants feared from their husbands (Regina v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte
Shah, [1999] 2 All E.R. 545 (H.L.) (UK)). When articulating a definition of persecution
that could encompass gender-based claims, the Law Lords took notice of the Kasinga
decision as well as other non-binding international precedents and also cited the gender
guidelines developed by the UK Refugee Women’s Group (Anker 2002, 137). The
decision’s analysis of persecution refers to two distinct legal components: serious harm

8

Studies in Law, Politics and Society Vol. 55 (2011)

LEILA KAWAR

and failure of state protection. However, the Law Lords called on adjudicators to go
beyond conventional juridical analysis to undertake a “global appraisal of an individual’s
past and present situation in a particular cultural, social, political and legal milieu” and
emphasized the need to bear in mind the “broad humanitarian purpose” of refugee law
(Regina v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Shah, [1999] 2 All E.R. 545, 561
(H.L.) (UK)). In doing so, the decision grounded refugee law in juridical terms while
endorsing a non-positivistic style of legal interpretation that remained open to
accommodating future developments in human rights norms.
Administrative bodies, courts, advocates, and legal scholars continue to engage in
dialog with one another across national borders on the topic of gender-based persecution.
They borrow, adapt, and build on each other's legal innovations. The principles
developed in early cases involving gender-based persecution have subsequently been
extended to new fact patterns and to cases involving related forms of gender-based
persecution (the Center for Gender and Refugee Studies at UC Hastings provides an
exhaustive summary of the current law on gender-based persecution, see
http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/law/). And through this transnational process of legal
development, a complex and rich body of "transnationalized" international law has come
into being, for which international human rights law provides the unifying theory (Anker
2002). There is now clear understanding that human rights principles give meaning to
the “right to enjoy asylum” (Lambert 2009).
The grounding of refugee law interpretation in a human rights paradigm takes
place despite the absence of a supervisory legal body for refugee law and despite the fact
that foreign jurisprudence and legal instruments are rarely taken as directly authoritative,
even when they are cited extra-nationally. Although litigation has played some role,
administrative agencies are probably more significant in internalizing gender-based
refugee principles. Most significant of all has been the role of NGOs. The international
women’s human rights movement opened a space in which this development and
dissemination of rights for a particular subset of marginal migrants could occur.
A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH TO MIGRANT LABOR STANDARDS
The development of a rights-based approach to migrant labor regulation
represents another path by which marginalized migrants are finding a place within the
international human rights system. Large-scale migrant labor flows have been a
perennial feature of capitalist economies. States in need of migrant labor have facilitated
these migrant labor flows, either by concluding bilateral guestworker agreements with
migrant sending countries or by adopting a policy of non-interference with labor
recruitment carried out by the private sector. The International Labour Organization
(ILO) is charged with assisting states in organizing labor migration. In 1947, the ILO’s
competence over the situation of migrants “in their quality as workers” was formally
recognized by the UN (Hasenau 1991).
The origins of international migrant labor standards date to the period
immediately following the First World War when pressure from workers’ organizations
and the shock of the Soviet Revolution pushed the victorious powers to establish an
international organization with the mandate of securing common action on matters
affecting conditions of employment. The newly created ILO almost immediately
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undertook the task of encouraging bilateral guestworker agreements in order to replace
chaotic prewar labor recruitment practices and provide a solution to postwar Europe’s
intensified manpower needs (Hasenau 1991, 689). Early recommendations stipulated that
the recruitment of migrant workers should be permitted only by mutual agreement
between countries concerned and after consultation with employers’ and workers’
organizations of the industries concerned (Hasenau 1991, 689). Demonstrating a
similarly corporatist approach, unemployment benefits would be accessible to migrant
workers solely on condition of reciprocity, so as to protect social security schemes in
destination countries from being flooded with an influx of less able workers.
After the Second World War, ILO practices moved away from supporting a
regime of bilateral agreements and placed greater emphasis on establishing flexible
universal standards. The ILO’s 1949 Migration for Employment Convention covered all
migrant workers, without condition of reciprocity, so long as they possessed the proper
work and residence permits. Supplementary provisions added in 1975 recommended that
states provide full social security benefits and that migrant workers be allowed to change
employers. Yet, reflecting the pro-restrictionist position typical of the labor movement at
the time, this move towards principles of equal treatment was accompanied by an
increasing focus on suppressing clandestine migration. Undocumented migrants,
identified by the ILO as “illegal workers,” continued to be excluded from coverage under
migrant labor conventions. Moreover, workers in sectors without labor union
representation, including seasonal agricultural workers and domestic workers, also
remained outside the ILO’s corporatist regulatory model.
In the mid-1970s, the ILO’s exclusive competence over international migrant
labor standards was challenged from within the UN General Assembly. Developing
countries with high levels of emigration were eager to address issues of migrant worker
rights through the UN rather than the ILO, both because they viewed the symbolism of
human rights as an effective mechanism for shaming the racist practices of destination
countries and because their governments were averse to addressing migrant rights
through an organization that was viewed as overly influenced by oppositional labor
unions (Bohning 1991, 700). Moreover, the ILO’s recent emphasis on curtailing
clandestine migration was unattractive to developing economies such as Mexico and
Morocco that depended on high levels of emigration to supply employment opportunities
and remittances (Bohning 1991, 700). When in 1978 the General Assembly established
a working group to undertake the drafting of a UN Migrant Worker Convention,
representatives of these countries took the lead in submitting an initial draft text that
featured strong declaratory statements against the racist environment faced by their
nationals in Europe and the United States (Lonnroth 1991, 732).
As the drafting process continued throughout the 1980s, however, the text of the
UN Migrant Worker Convention acquired elements of the legalistic aesthetic that has
come to typify the contemporary international human rights system. The first steps in
this direction were taken by delegates from small-sized, social democratic Mediterranean
and Scandinavian states (the so-called MESCA group), who came to embrace the
Convention drafting process as an opportunity to create a “serious, well-functioning
human rights instrument” that would further the overall legalization of the international
system that these states relied upon to protect their own security (Lonnroth 1991, 733).
Their approach focused on making the legal document as useful as possible for the
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individual migrant worker rather than adopting the collective rights framework endorsed
by developing countries. They also moved away from the initial draft text’s more radical
statements of absolute rights, replacing these with provisions in which rights are qualified
by the state’s reserved authority to regulate admission and regularization.
In the final phases of the Convention’s drafting, legalization developed a life of its
own. German legal experts pointed out lacunae and legal errors as well as contradictions
within the text, even though it was clear from the beginning that Germany was unlikely to
sign the Convention (1991, 734). Similarly, there was widespread belief that the US
would not sign and ratify the Convention in the immediate future, but US delegates
nevertheless strove to make the draft meet high legal standards and to make its content as
close to its interests as possible “in order to create prerequisites for an eventual
ratification at some later stage” and in order to prevent the instrument from becoming a
mere political device (1991, 734). These drafters acted as positivist legal technicians,
softening differences between the various delegations, proposing compromises and
alternative formulations that would take into account the various interests and thereby
make the negotiations progress while ensuring that the text remained cohesive and noncontradictory.
The Convention that was finally enacted by the General Assembly in December
1990 illustrates how human rights can be made compatible with migrant labor issues in a
manner that produces legally enforceable standards. The text moves away from the
ILO’s corporatist framework by conceptualizing an individual migrant worker whose
rights are not dependent on his or her representation by traditional labor organizations
(Bohning 1991, 703). Basic civil and political rights to liberty, free expression, and
privacy were reformulated in the specific context of labor migration, thereby articulating
rights to freedom of movement, guaranteed days of rest, control over personal
documents, advance information about terms of employment, etc. In addition, the
Convention’s balance of sovereign territorial authority and individual human rights
signals an attempt to produce a text that would be taken seriously by ratifying states
(Bosniak 1991). Thus, while the Convention emphasizes that states must treat
individuals with dignity and human respect even if they are undocumented, it contains no
provision enunciating a right to enter any other country. Rather than a statement of
vision, the Convention aims to be a legally enforceable document that could also provide
a conceptual base for the future development of migrant worker rights.
Yet progress was initially slow in further developing the Convention’s principles.
Over the ten years following its enactment by the General Assembly, only eleven
countries ratified it. In large part, this was due to the fact that the drafting process had
been state-centric and no broad social movement had done the work of shifting
consciousness among politicians and the public towards support of the Convention or in
favor of migrant worker rights more generally. In order for these rights to be
implemented in the form of either enforceable administrative guidelines or judicial
principles, they would need to be embraced by a transnational constituency of human
rights entrepreneurs who could propel the internalization of international norms at the
local level.
A transnational movement in defense of migrant worker rights did eventually
emerge in the 1990s through a process of coalition building and as the result of the
changing political dynamics produced by economic globalization. On the one hand,
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migrant workers in the informal sector, who had been excluded from the traditional labor
regulations, mobilized through a panoply of geographically diverse grassroots
organizations (D'Souza 2010). Inspired by the rights-based discourse popularized by the
women’s movement and indigenous people’s movement, associations of migrant
domestic workers were particularly active in framing their struggles in the language of
universal human rights (Freeman et al. 2003). On the other hand, the trade union
movement, which had previously been hostile to migrant workers and uninterested in
organizing workers in the informal sector, moved towards adopting a human rights
approach to migrant labor issues. Labor federations in Europe and North America
rejuvenated their organizing agenda to reverse declining union density, reconsidered their
views on the ability of the state to completely control migration in an era of economic
internationalization, and became normatively committed to the idea that migrants have
rights that are impeded by tough immigration control measures (Haus 2002).
International human rights conferences during the 1990s provided important sites
for networking among activist organizations. Migrant worker activists and their
supporters held meetings, distributed information, and were successful in including
language on migrant workers into the final conference documents (Grange & d'Auchamp
2009, 83). The discussions generated at these international conferences also served to
anchor the issue of migrant human rights on the agenda of the UN Commission on
Human Rights, which was itself becoming increasingly participatory as NGO
consultative status was opened to national and regional NGOs after 1996. In the late
1990s, the Commission initiated an Intergovernmental Working Group on the Human
Rights of Migrants as well as a Special Rapporteur on the issue. These structures in turn
provided additional sites for engagement between inter-governmental organizations and
NGOs and thus paved the way for the creation in 1998 of a “Global Campaign for
Ratification of the Convention on Rights of Migrants” (Grange & d'Auchamp 2009, 84).
As a result, by the beginning of the new millennium, the emerging coalition of grassroots
associations campaigning for migrant worker rights was reinforced not only by trade
union activism at the national and international level but also by international human
rights NGOs and religious organizations such as the World Council of Churches and
Caritas.
This transnational campaign on behalf of the Convention has propelled a
dissemination of the concept of migrant worker rights, even in states that show little
interest in signing or ratifying the Convention. In Europe, a Platform for Migrant Worker
Rights was launched in 2002 to lobby EU policymakers, and awareness-raising
campaigns have been successful in eliciting calls for ratification and statements in
support of the Convention’s principles from the European Commission and the European
Parliament (MacDonald & Cholewinski 2009). During the same period, US-based NGOs
who participated in the Global Campaign have drawn on the Convention’s provisions
when filing statements and shadow reports on the protection of migrant workers’ human
rights in both the Human Rights Committee and the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (Smith 2007, 306). Similarly, a “Human Rights Tribunal” condemning
violations of migrant domestic workers’ rights under the Convention was organized in
2005 by a coalition of local and international NGOs in New York City (311). The Global
Campaign has thus constructed a new “norm-creating forum” (Koh 1999) for promoting a
human rights approach to migrant labor issues.
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One of the sites where this rights-based approach has been most visibly developed
is, somewhat surprisingly, within the ILO itself. Beginning in the late 1990s, the
organization leant its institutional support to the Global Campaign as part of a more
general infusion of human rights concepts into its work (Bohning 1991). As a result,
nongovernmental participants in the Global Campaign exercised significant influence
over the drafting of the ILO’s Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration (Grange &
d'Auchamp 2009), which compiles an exhaustive list of international best practices for
the implementation of migrant worker rights. Among the rights-oriented practices that are
singled out as models for other countries is the policy of the Philippines Overseas
Employment Administration requiring legally enforceable work contracts and monitoring
recruitment agencies to ensure their compliance, as well as New Zealand’s policy of
providing information on labor rights in several languages and organizing English
language classes for migrant workers (International Migration Programme 2006, 50). In
addition, over the past ten years, the ILO has played an important role in developing
effective and useful programs to protect migrant workers by organizing regional
workshops with trade unions and with the government ministries concerned with migrant
workers (D'Souza 2010).
The ILO’s most recent contribution in this area has been to undertake the drafting
of a new convention on the rights of domestic workers, scheduled to be completed in July
2011. The text draws on legislative language developed in recent years by migrant
domestic workers and their supporters in a variety of national contexts, including the
“Freedom Charter for Domestic Workers” passed in 2007 by the Philippines Senate and
the “Domestic Workers Bill of Rights” passed in 2010 by New York State (D'Souza
2010). The Domestic Worker Convention aims to further articulate provisions contained
in the Migrant Workers Convention, detailing specific ways in which these principles can
be made meaningful in the context of migrant domestic work. For example, elaborating
on the principle of equal standards for workplace safety, the ILO Convention’s draft text
specifies that destination countries should “provid[e] for a system of visits to households
in which migrant domestic workers will be employed and develop a network of
emergency housing” (International Labour Office 2010). Migrant domestic workers have
traditionally been exempted from minimum labor standards and principles of equal
treatment, and are among the most vulnerable migrant workers. These marginal migrants
have now become the subject of human rights oriented legal development.
In sum, the process of legally implementing the norms contained in the UN
Migrant Workers Convention is still in its early stages. There has been some progress
made in disseminating the Convention’s norms in destination countries and advocates are
optimistic about the prospects for further progress even though this process is taking
place largely in the absence of any directly binding legal authority. Because the
Convention has not been ratified by many migrant destination states, lobbying efforts
before legislatures and administrative agencies appear to hold more potential than
litigation for realizing migrant workers’ human rights. At this point, migrant worker
rights have a foothold within the international human rights system but their legal
development remains far from complete.
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CONCLUSION
The transnational process through which human rights are being developed for
marginal migrants is still in its early stages. It has not received the attention nor
produced the sometimes spectacular policy outcomes that have resulted from other
transnational processes, such as those that have added a strong security dimension to the
politics of immigration (Bigo 2001; Guiraudon & Joppke 2001) or those that have paired
migration with discussions of economic development (Castles & Wise 2008). It is these
latter framings of immigration that have dominated the ongoing development of EU
immigration and asylum policy, seen most clearly in the 1999 Tampere Programme and
its regulation-centered rather than rights-centered approach. A number of inter-state
dialogues, such as the UN-sponsored Global Forum on Migration and Development or
the Transatlantic Council on Migration, have also made highly visible links between
migration and either development or security. Indeed, in Europe, international
cooperation between border enforcement officials was so effective that it provided the
initial impetus for developing a European migrant rights NGO network, which aimed to
contribute a rights-based perspective to counteract the security emphasis of EU
policymaking (Guiraudon 2002).
The dominance of the security and development frames within policy circles
demonstrates just how difficult it is in the current macro-political context of aggressive
neoliberal globalization to develop and enforce the rights of marginal migrants. The
lukewarm reception accorded to the Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers has
been due at least in part to the fact that its enactment by the General Assembly coincided
with a period of rampant globalization in which the forces of capital have found it in their
interest to maintain a mobile but highly vulnerable labor force (Taran 2009).
These inhospitable conditions have compounded the inherent tensions of the
international human rights system arising from international commitments to the
protection of state sovereignty as well as to universal individual rights. Although this
tension is present throughout the human rights field, in the area of international migration
the conflict is all the greater. As legal scholar Linda Bosniak explains, when it comes to
questions of migrant rights, “human rights interests contend not merely with states’
relative jurisdictional independence from international authority but also with a central
substantive aspect of sovereignty: states’ plenary territorial powers, one attribute of
which is their virtually uncontested authority to control the admission and exclusion of
aliens and to confer nationality – to, in effect, prescribe the composition of the national
community” (Bosniak 1991, 752). According to Bosniak, migrant rights present the
ultimate “hard case,” the fact that migrant rights appear at all in international human
rights law demonstrates the power of universal human rights principles.
In addition to telling us something about the power of human rights discourse, the
development of migrant human rights provides insight into the culture of the
contemporary international human rights system. As previous socio-legal work has
pointed out, human rights laws are developed and internalized through a process that is
transnational rather than simply international. Normative development is the result of
“conversation, interplay, and dialogue” between public officials and a range of other
actors who struggle to practice human rights according to their own vision (Speed 2008).
In the field of migrant human rights we can see this in the way that grassroots campaigns
by migrant domestic workers and their supporters have called on the spirit of the
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Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers to take their claims to the streets as part of
efforts to educate the public about the Convention (Smith 2007). A recent study of the
attempt in one US city to pass a local ordinance inspired by international human rights
conventions demonstrates a similar dynamic whereby grassroots groups use human rights
norms writ large as a tool for educating the public (Merry et al. 2010). The authors see
this grassroots form of implementation as holding substantial transformative promise,
especially in a political context where – as in the case of the Convention on the Rights of
Migrant Workers - the US government has shown no interest in placing itself under the
control of international law.
While grassroots movements are critical to the internalization of international
human rights principles, the power of transnational legal processes derives from a
symbiotic relationship between actors at different levels. In this respect, these processes
diverge greatly from the legal positivist ideal of clear hierarchy. Widespread
mobilization occurs when actors in a range of locations, and operating at a range of
scales, are joined in a single “community” (Boyle 2002). UN institutions provide one
possible node in this network of mobilization, but so do other sites of activity.
Anthropologist Winifred Tate describes the landscape of the international human rights
system as “ephemeral, developing through the specific temporal windows of conferences,
commissions and meetings” (Tate 2007, 191). In the case of the Global Campaign for
Ratification of the Migrant Rights Convention, a webportal (december18.net) proved to
be a crucial site at which multilateral and intergovernmental agencies, international
NGOs, national and regional NGOs, and grassroots groups could share information and
coordinate strategies.
At the same time that the internalization and enforcement of migrant human rights
principles has not proceeded according to a positivist vision of law, the process of
formulating both migrant worker rights and refugee protections has been highly legalistic.
A fundamental component of the contemporary epistemology of human rights is its
legalization (Wilson 2007). This tendency towards formalism and technical expertise can
serve instrumental purposes, allowing for consensus to develop and thus for new rights to
be established in international human rights texts (Riles 2000). It allowed the Convention
on the Rights of Migrant Workers to come into being. And rights for migrant workers
have previously made an appearance in other international human rights instruments,
similarly qualified by the principle of sovereign territorial authority (For a comprehensive
survey, see Slinckx 2009).
But the legalization of human rights can also make it easier for those with power
to wield them against the less powerful, finding legalistic justifications to suspend rights
when it suits their ends. National security has proved to be a particularly useful
justification for weakening the human rights prohibition on torture, even before the era of
the so-called “war on terror” (Asad 1997). These national emergency exceptions have
also found their way into refugee law, so that even if there is no doubt that an individual
has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of one of the five grounds, he or she is
ineligible for asylum if there is even a purely financial connection to a group that has
been declared a “terrorist organization.”
The tendency to blur human rights with humanitarianism is also a danger of
legalization, especially in the current political context in which “good migrants” are
sharply distinguished from “bad migrants.” When legal arguments on behalf of gender-
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based asylum claims adopt a pragmatic and instrumental tone, they emphasize that
granting asylum to women fleeing traditional customs “won’t open the floodgates” to all
of the poor and oppressed in the world (See Miller Bashir 1997). The legalistic qualities
of international law ensure that few rights are absolute.
The challenges of implementing the Convention on the Rights of Migrant
Workers also points to the ambiguous nature of legalized formulations of human rights.
As Bosniak astutely points out, the difficulty in enforcing the Convention is practical,
since undocumented migrant workers are unlikely to be able to claim their rights when by
doing so they risk bringing themselves to the attention of immigration enforcement
officials (Bosniak 1991, 765). If marginal migrants seeking to have human rights
standards upheld are pitted alone against the state, the interests of the sovereign are
bound to shape how law is applied in practice.
The reformulation of migrant rights as human rights is very much an ongoing
political process.
Marginal migrants are far from fully embedded within the
individualistic and universalistic legal categories of human rights law. A conceptual
distinction between the “deliberative” approach to human rights, which locates human
rights discourse in the context of contemporary power structures, and the “protest”
approach to human rights, which sees human rights as relatively more conducive to
counter-hegemonic struggles, may be helpful in further theorizing the possible routes
available to this unsettled field (Dembour 2010). Whether migrant human rights are best
conceptualized as part of the current neo-liberal deliberated consensus of late modernity,
or whether they are best understood as the result of protest, and thus subject to further
expansion by social justice and migrant solidarity movements remains to be seen.
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